1. INTRODUCTION Models of location are appropriate in a number of contexts in economics and political science. For example, firms choose where to position stores and which of a spectrum of goods to produce, and politicians select the nature of their platforms. In such models it is natural to look for a collection of locations with the property that the location of each individual is optimal, given the positions of all other individuals. However, the pure strategy Nash equilibrium provides a solution which is both incomplete and unsatisfactory. Incomplete, because in many cases no such equilibrium exists. Unsatisfactory, because even when it does exist it may not be robust to the specification of the model.
Consider, for example, a simple case (the "pure" location model of Hotelling [1929] ). Consumers are distributed on the interval [0, 1] . Each of a fixed number of firms chooses a location in [0, 1] and receives a payoff equal to the fraction of consumers for which it is the nearest firm. Then if there are three firms, there is no pure strategy equilibrium unless the distribution of consumers is degenerate. There is such an equilibrium if there are four or more firms and the distribution of consumers is uniform; but there is none if there are five or more firms and the density of this distribution is either strictly convex or strictly concave, however close it is to being uniform.
One way to avoid these problems is to modify the model. For example, if the firms locate on a circle rather than a line segment, or move sequentially rather than simultaneously, the difficulties may be mitigated. However, in many cases of interest a line segment is the relevant space, and the assumption of simultaneous moves is appropriate (or, at least, any particular sequence of moves is arbitrary).
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appropriate model is a repeated game). However, the idea of individuals consciously randomizing may be unappealing. If so, the results on the "purification'' of equilibria provide an attractive alternative interpretation. The basic idea is that a mixed strategy equilibrium can, under appropriate conditions, be viewed as a pure strategy equilibrium in a game of incomplete information. Firms may not know precisely what the payoffs are-for example, they may obtain information about the distribution of consumers from noisy market surveys. If the private signals they receive are independent and atomless, then an equilibrium in which firms randomize may be equivalent to one in which, contingent on the signal received, each firm uses a pure strategy. The randomness of the signals means that the action taken by each firm varies randomly, but no firm consciously randomizes.
A variety of results on purification has been established, notably by Aumann et al. [1983] and Milgram and Weber [1981] . Our games do not satisfy the assumptions in either of these papers, since each firm has a continuum of pure strategies (rather than finitely many, as in Aumann et al.) , and its payoff function has discontinuities (rather than being continuous, as (for the most part) in Milgrom and Weber). Thus we cannot directly apply their results; it is possible that the results could be extended to cover our games. The type of purification result of perhaps the most relevance to our games is the convergence result <?f Harsanyi [1973] (although once again our games do not satisfy his assumptions). He considers approximating a game of complete information with a sequence of games of incomplete information. Each of the latter has a pure strategy equilibrium, as described above, in which the action of each player depends on his type, and is thus random from the p'oint of view of the other players. Harsanyi shows that pure strategy equilibria in a sequence of approximating games can almost always be found with the property that the distributions over pure strategies which these equilibria generate converge to the distribution associated with any given mixed strategy equilibrium in the original game. In our context, games in which the firms are slightly uncertain about their payoffs may have equilibria which generate distributions over actions which are very similar to those generated by the mixed strategy equilibria we find. (Section 5 of Milgram and Weber [1981] , and Harsanyi [1977] contain further discussion of issues in the interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria.)
Our results concern mixed strategy equilibrium in the simple location model described above. They are of three types. First, we study the symmetric mixed strategy equilibria (F, .. . , F) for an arbitrary distribution of consumers and arbitrary number of firms (see Proposition 3). An explicit characterization of an equilibrium strategy F appears to be impossible; we show that any such F possesses some natural properties. Second, we show that the symmetric equilibrium strategy approaches the distribution function of consumers as the number of firms increases (see Proposition 4). That is, when the number of firms is large, the firms distribute themselves in the same way as the consumers. This makes sense: when there are many firms, it is likely that each firm will have neighbors to the left and right, so that the endpoints of the line segment exert little influence on the solution, and firms spread out according to the distribution of consumers, as they would on a circle. Finally, we study the case of three firms and a uniform distribution of consumers. It is known that in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium of this game, each firm randomizes uniformly over [1/4, 3/4] (see Shaked [1982] ). We show that the game has other, asymmetric equilibria. In fact, there is a unique (up to symmetry) equilibrium in which at least one firm uses a pure strategy (see Propostion 5). In this equilibrium, two firms randomize, putting most weight near 1/4 and 3/4 (see Figure 1) , while the third locates with probability one at 1/2.
Our results on the qualitative properties of equilibrium have direct empirical implications. For example, across independent three-person political races, the prediction is that either all the platforms chosen will be uniformly distributed over the middle two quartiles of the spectrum, or one will always be in the center, while the other two are close to the quartiles.
THE MODEL AND RESULTS
Consumers are distributed on the line segment [0, 1] . Let C(x) be the fraction of consumers to the left of x plus half of the fraction at x (so that if there are no atoms in the distribution of consumers, C is just the cumulative distribution function). Let F"(C) be the game in which n firms choose locations in [0, 1] .
Precisely, the pure strategy set of each firm is S = [0, 1] , and each payoff function 
As usual, the set of mixed strategies of each firm is the set of cumulative distribution functions on S, and we extend K 1 to mixed strategy n-tuples. We always use upper case letters (e.g. F, G) to denote mixed strategies, reserving lower case letters for pure strategies. Thus when, for example, we write K 1 (s, F, t), it is to be understood that firms 1 and 3 are using pure strategies, and firm 2 is using a mixed strategy. It is clear that the strategy pair (F 1 , F 2 ) is an equilibrium of T 2 ( C) if the support of each F; (denoted supp F;) is a subset of M(C). It is also easy to show that there are no other equilibria, as follows. PROPOSITION 1. The strategy pair (F 1 , F 2 ) is an equilibrium of P(C) if and only ifsupp F;£M(C)for i=1, 2. In particular, ifC has a unique median m then F 2 (C) has a unique equilibrium, in which each firm locates at m with probability one.
PROOF. It is clear that (s 1 , s 2 ) is a pure strategy equilibrium if s;EM(C) for i = 1, 2. Suppose (F 1 , F 2 ) is also an equilibrium. Then since F 2 ( C) is constant sum, (F 1 , s 2 ) is an equilibrium. But this is so only if supp F 1 £ M( C). Lerner and Singer [1937] and Eaton and Lipsey [1975] have studied the pure equilibria of F"( C) for n;;::; 3. Eaton and Lipsey show, in particular, the following. 1
PROPOSITION 2. (Eaton and Lipsey). (a)
If C is increasing and (s 1 , ... , s,) is a pure strategy equilibrium of T"(C) with s 1 ~ ... ~s, then s 1 =s 2 and s,_ 1 =s,.
(
b) If C is increasing then T 3 (C) has no pure strategy equilibrium. (c) If Cis differentiable then T"(C) has a pure strategy equilibrium only if n is at most twice the number of local maximizers of C'. (d) If Cis uniform then F"(C) possesses a unique pure strategy equilibrium ifn=4 or 5, and a continuum of such equilibria ifn;;:;6.
Part (a) of this result is easy to see: if a peripheral firm is not paired then since C is increasing, the firm can gain customers by moving towards its neighbor. Part (b) follows from (a), given that s 1 =s 2 =s 3 is obviously not an equilibrium. The equilibria in (d) are easy to find. For example, if n = 4 then s 1 = s 2 = 1/4, s 3 = s 4 = 3/4 defines the equilibrium, and if n=5 we have s 1 =s 2 =l/6, s 3 =1/2, and s 4 = s 5 = 5/6. Part (b) shows that pure strategy equilibrium is an inadequate solution concept for the location problems we are considering. The implications of part (c) emphasize this: if C is differentiable and C' is either strictly concave (one local maximizer) or strictly convex (two local maximizers) then, however close C is to being uniform, F"( C) possesses no pure strategy equilibrium if n;;::; 5. More generally, if C' has finitely many local maximizers then T"(C) possesses no pure strategy equilibrium when the number of firms is large enough.
Thus the pure strategy equilibria are nonrobust to variations in the specification of the model; our approach is to turn to the mixed strategy equilibria. We prove three results about these equilibria. It is known from the work of Dasgupta and Maskin [1982a and b] that F"(C) possesses a symmetric mixed strategy equi-librium (F~, ... , F~) . (See also Simon [1984] for a very general existence theorem for equilibria in location games.) We first study the general characteristics of F~, and then prove a result on its asymptotic behavior as n-HYJ. Finally, when n = 3 and C is uniform we find all (asymmetric) equilibria in which at least one firm uses a pure strategy. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Our first result is the following.
PROPOSITION 3. If n ~ 3 and C is nonatomic then the game T"(C) has a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (F~, ... , F~) , and in every such equilibrium F~ is atomless. If C is symmetric about 1/2 (i.e. C(s)=1-C(1-s)) then P(C) has an atomless symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (F~, ... , F~) in which F~ is symmetric about 1/2. IfC is uniform then in addition the support ofF~ is an interval [a~, 1-aH Even though Proposition 3 puts some restrictions on the characteristics of a symmetric equilibrium, it would be nice to have some explicit examples. However, except in the case n = 3 and C uniform, it seems not to be possible to make the necessary calculations. To appreciate the problem, consider the payoff of firm 1 when it locates at z and every other firm uses the atomless strategy F. This payoff is
Using the binomial theorem on the middle term, and integrating by parts, this reduces, in the case where C is differentiable, to
The problem of finding a symmetric equilibrium is thus the problem of finding a nondecreasing F such that K 1 (z, F, ... , F) is constant on supp F. Even if C is uniform this is a difficult problem -(2) is a nonlinear integral equation, about which little in general is known. We can however use (2) to prove a result on the behavior ofF as n increases without bound. The idea is simple. If there is a large number of firms, all using F, then wherever firm i locates it is very likely to have neighbors close to the left and right, and we can ignore the possibility that all the other firms are on one side of firm i. If C is uniform but F is not, then at those points where the density of F exceeds 1, the left and right neighbors are likely to be closer than when this density is less than 1, so that the payoff at the former is lower than at the latter. Thus such an F cannot be an equilibrium -a firm is not indifferent between all points in the support of F. Similarly, for arbitrary (but differentiable) C, when n is large the payoff is not constant if F '(x) is different from C'(x). Formally, the result is as follows. (The strong assumptions, which make the proof relatively straightforward, can probably be relaxed somewhat.) PROPOSITION 4. Let C be twice continuously differentiable and suppose (F", ... , F") is an equilibrium of F"(C) for each n=1, 2, ... , where F" is twice continuously differentiable and there exists a strategy F which is twice continuously differentiable such that F"-+F, F" '-+F', and F""-+F" uniformly. Then F=C. When n = 3 and C is uniform, it is known that there is a symmetric equilibrium (F, F, F) in which F is uniform on [1/4, 3/4] (see Shaked [1982] 
229
The density of the strategy F given in this result is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Note that the result does not rule out the possibility of asymmetric mixed strategy equilibria in which all three firms randomize. 
For any function f, f(x-) and f(x +) are respectively the left and right limits of fat x.
The following result (a generalization of Proposition 2(b)) is used in the proofs of Propositions 3 and 5. PROOF. Let f= (Fv ... , F 11 ) be an equilibrium of P(C). If xis an atom of F 1 then we need P 1 (x, f)"?;,P 1 (x-, f) and P 1 (x, f)"?;,P 1 (x+, f), and hence, in particular, we need or, using the Dominated Convergence Theorem and letting ~=(x, s 2 , ... , s,.), (S 11 ) "?;, 0. Now, using (1) and the nonatomicity of C, we find that #¢, ~1 Cl:)=Oif L 1 (£)=¢. Since p 1 Cl:)~~1 ( §)for all(s 2 , ... , s 11 ), we have C(p 1 (~)) ~ C(~1 (~)) for all (s 2 , ... , S 11 ). Thus, using ( 4), the integrand in the left-hand side of (3) is nonpositive for all (s 2 , ••• , s 11 ); because of the inequality in (3) it must therefore be zero except possibly on a set ofF 2 .. · F 11 -measure zero. Hence if the strategies of two firms -say firms 2 and 3 -in addition to firm 1 have atoms at x, then, since 2/q 1 (x, x, x, s 4 , ... , S 11 ) -1 < 0 for all s 4 , ... , s 11 , we need C (p 1 (x, x, x, s 4 , ... , s 11 )) = C (~1 (x, x, x, s 4 , ... , S 11 ) ) for all (s 4 , ... , s 11 ) except possibly a set of F 4 .. ·F 11 -measure zero. Since C(p 1 (x, x, x, s 4 , .... , S 11 )) ~ C(p 1 (x, s 2 , ... , S 11 )) and C(~1 (x; x, x, s 4 , ... , s 11 )) ~C(~1 (x, s 2 , ... , S 11 )) for all (s 2 , ... , S 11 ), this implies that C (p 1 (x,s 2 , . .. , S 11 ))=C(~1 (x, s 2 , ... , S 11 )) for all (s 2 , ... , S 11 ) except possibly a set of F 2 .. ·F 11 -measure zero. (If, when firms 2 and 3 locate at x, firm 1 attracts no customers with probability one, then this is also true wherever firms 2 and 3 locate.) But then P 1 (x, .fj=O, contradicting the fact that the equilibrium payoff of firm 1 is positive (since it can obtain a positive payoff by locating at any point in the support of C). Thus the strategy of at most one firm in addition to firm l has an atom at x. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. If n ~ 3 and C is nonatomic then the game F"(C) possesses a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium by Theorem 6 of Dasgupta and Maskin [1982b] . Let (F, ... , F) be such an equilibrium. By Lemma 1, F is nonatomic.
We now show that if Cis symmetric about 1/2 then P(C) possesses an equilibrium (F, ... , F) in which F is symmetric about 1/2. Consider the game F" (C) in which the pure strategy setS of each firm is [0, 1/2], and the payoff function of i is defined by K 1 (s 1 , ... , s") = KtC1/2(s 1 )*1/2 (1-s 1 ) , ... , 1/2(s 11 )*1/2(1-s 11 ) ) for i = 1, ... , n, where 1/2(x)*1/2(1-x) denotes the mixed strategy in P(C) which has atoms of size 1/2 at x and 1-x. That is, using a pure strategy s in T"( C) is the same as using s with probability 1/2 and 1-s with probability 1/2 in P( C). Note that given the definition of K 1 , whenever F 1 is a mixed strategy for each i we have KtCF1> ... , F 11 )=K 1 (F 1 , ... , F,) where
Now, by Theorem 6 ofDasgupta and Maskin [1982a] the game F"(C) possesses a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium (F, .. . , F). Let F be the mixed strategy corresponding to F, as above. Then
.. , F)/2+
P 1 (1-s, F, ... , F)/2=P 1 (s, F, ... , F) , using the symmetry of C and F to obtain the last equality. Hence (F, ... , F) is an equilibrium of P(C) with F symmetric about 1/2; F is atomless by the first part of the result.
Finally, we show that if Cis uniform and (F, ... , F) is an equilibrium in which F is symmetric about 1/2 then the support ofF is an interval [a, 1-a] . Suppose, to the contrary, that xE;t:supp F, a <x< 1-a. Let b=max {s~x: s E supp F} and c=min{s~x: sesuppF}; band c exist since supp F is closed, and F(b)=F(c), since F is nonatomic. Let f= (F, ... , F) . Then (dropping the superfluous subscript from P;(x, F)) we have Since F is nondecreasing and atomless, and bE supp F, F is left-increasing at b. Therefore the support ofF contains at most a single gap. Since F is symmetric, this means that supp F= [a, 
We now argue that b = 1/2. In order for f to be an equilibrium we need P(z, f)=1Jn almost everywhere with respect to F. Now, for O~z~1 we have (2)). Thus, since F is atomless, P( ·, f) is continuous, and hence we need
. Now, ifF is differentiable at z then so is P( ·,f), and we have
where the first term in braces is obtained by using the symmetry of F. Suppose that b < 1/2. Then for z = b the first two terms in braces are positive and the third is zero (given F(b)= 1/2). J;Ience given the continuity ofF, the first two terms are positive on (b-a, b) for some a>O; the third term is also positive on this interval. Further, since F is almost everywhere differentiable (being a cumulative distribution function), it is differentiable somewhere in (b-a, b) so that this argument
shows that the derivative of P( ·,f) is positive at some point in (b-a, b) , contradicting the fact that it must be zero on [a, b] . Thus we must have b=1/2. Q.E.D.
To prove Proposition 4, we need the following preliminary result. 
PROOF. We first claim that (5) for all (j > 0 there exist N and e > 0 such that if n > N and x < e then
This follows by noting that lf"'( 
So, letting N be such that it also satisfies (1
thus establishing the first half of the limit in the Proposition. Now supposef'(O)>O. Then by (5) there exist Nand e>O such thatf"'(x)> f'(0)/2 > 0 if 0 ~ x ~ e and n > N, and hence Further, we havef"(x)'?;,xj'(0)/2, or 1-f"(x);i;1-xj'(0)/2, ifO;;i;x;;i;e, so that the limit of the third term is zero. Finally, the limit of the first term is g'(0)/!'(0), completing the proof.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Since each F" is atomless, we can conclude, as in the proof of Proposition 3, that P"(z, f") = 1/n (the equilibrium payoff of each firm), or nP"(z, f")=1, for all zEsuppF". (We write F"=(F", ... ,F") , and now explicitly record the dependence of the payoff functions on n .) Also, since the equilibrium payoff 1/n goes to zero as n~oo, (6) for any z E supp C and any e > 0 there exists N such that (z-e, z +e) n supp F" # ¢ if n > N (otherwise a firm can guarantee a positive payoff by locating at z). Hence, given the continuity of nP"(z, f") in z, (7) lim nP"(z, f") = 1
for all z E supp C.
n-HIJ
Now, for each n we have
(see (2)). Let a=minsupp C, b=max supp C. Obviously supp F"c [a, b] for all n, and if z E supp C n (a, b) then O<F"(z) < 1 for large enough n (see (6)), so that the first two terms in (8) go to zero. Since C(a/2)=0 and C((1+b)/2)=1, the first two terms of nP"(z, f") are also zero for z=a or b.
We can use Lemma 2 to determine the limits of the last two terms as n ~ oo by defining the variables appropriately (i.e. in the first case c=z, x=z-u, g(x) = -2C(z--:-x/2) and f"(x)=F"(z)-F"(z-x), while in the second case c= 1-z, x=u-z, g(x) =2C ( PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. Let (c, F, G) be an equilibrium of F 3 (U). By Proposition 2(b) we can assume without loss of generality that F is not pure and a(F)<c. Clearly we must then have a(G)=a(F)=a, say (since 2's payoff is increasing on [0, a( G))). We can further assume without loss of generality that fJ(F)'?;,fJ(G). Clearly we must have fJ (F)'?;,c, and either (i) y) n (supp G)=¢, and either x$supp G or xeJ (F) . Reversing the roles ofF and G establishes that x E J(F) n J(G) and, since (x, y) is an arbitrary gap, we have
; by (a) the first term is zero, so the expression is positive, contradicting the fact that x E J(F). + (c/3 -s) (1-F(c/3))/2. Now, using the fact that
we obtain [c, b] . By (c), F and G are atomless, except possibly at c. As in the proof of (h), they are also differentiable; the conditions that K 2 (c, ·,G) and Kic, F, ·) be constant on (a, c) imply that G'(t)(c-3t)-G(t)+1=0 and similarly for F. Given F(a)=G(a)=O (because of(e) and (c)) we have We can make similar arguments for c<t<b; we obtain (11) F(t) = G(t) = (2-3b+c)1/ 3 (2-3t+c)-1/3 if c < t ~b.
Thus F and G have an atom of the same size at c; since firm 3 has an atom there, the size of the atoms is zero by Lemma 1, and F = G is differentiable except possibly at c. We now determine the position of c. First note that for equilibrium we need K 2 (c, c-, F) =Kic, c+, F) (both of which must equal the equilibrium payoff
